

**Interests and Goals: The Party, Presidential Candidates and Voters
Presentation and Question and Answer by
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**Commission on Presidential Nomination Timing and Scheduling
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Presentation by Dr. Thomas Mann

DR. MANN: Thank you very much, Alexis, David. I appreciate the opportunity to be with the Commission and members. Thanks for having me and listening to me.

My memory immediately goes back to those days in the late '70s and early '80s, when, as a member of the Winograd Commission and then, sort of, working on behalf of the Hunt Commission, I was deeply involved in these issues. I dug out an old frantic memo I wrote to Governor Hunt about the front-loading problem – this was the early 1980s -- and my fear that it would either produce the nomination of an insurgent candidate that no members of the party knew anything about, and that we might come to regret, or that would so freeze in the frontrunner that we would do ourselves damage, as well.

In the years after the 1968 convention, as Elaine has so colorfully portrayed, the Democratic Party has invested enormous resources in changing the rules of the presidential nominating game. Sometimes it's to fight the last war, other times to respond to party constituencies or interests, but always with an eye toward how it might help or hurt a particular candidate or a particular type of candidate.

There is, in the Democratic Party, an amazing faith in the critical role that rules and procedures play in producing political outcomes. Now, I find it hard to believe that anyone would design the present front-loaded system if they, today, were to start from scratch. Let's acknowledge that reality. It is unusual to have a special permanent position for Iowa and New Hampshire, to have such a small number of states and voters involved in decision-making, to have such a relatively limited time for scrutiny and deliberation on candidates in the formal process, while most citizens think the process is unbelievably long, because, of course, of the invisible primary and its extended length, at least a year before the year of the election itself and, I would add, the cash demands on candidates, on serious candidates, at the beginning of the formal process. We may talk about retail politics in Iowa and New Hampshire, but

I recommend looking at the advertising budgets for those states. There is retail politics, and there's wholesale politics going on at the same time.

It's probably worth asking the question, then, Are these shortcomings that we see in the system -- and I think, to be honest about it, you will agree they are shortcomings -- are they instrumental in producing deleterious effects on the party? That is, is it the outcomes that we worry about, or is it the nature of the process itself?

One of the useful things in this regard is to simply engage in the exercise of historical counterfactual and try to imagine a different calendar, a -- different timing arrangements, and ask yourself; in each of those elections, Would the Democrats have nominated a different candidate? Would that candidate have been stronger? Would the party have been more unified and better able to contest the campaign?

In any case, whatever the shortcomings of the system, it is not obvious what alternative calendar would reliably produce the desired outcomes. That's partly because of Don Fowler's law of unintended consequences. It's partly the fact that the timing of primaries and caucuses is only one among many factors that determines the outcome. The pool of candidates running, the mood of voters, the role of the media, money, a whole host of factors are involved here, and we have to keep that in mind. Nor is it obvious that the party could implement and enforce the chosen alternative. Your Commission has to deliberate with that. I don't think there's an open and shut case on that. But it's problematic, and you need to acknowledge that at the beginning.

Now, David and Alexis asked me to look at this from the point of view of the goals of the party, of the presidential candidates, and of the voters. And I think it's important to begin with the party, because that's your responsibility.

There is one central objective for the party, in my view, in this whole process that overwhelms everything else; namely, to nominate a strong candidate who is well positioned to compete effectively in the general election campaign. That means someone who can unify and mobilize the

party base, appeal to swing voters, articulate core values and the compelling policy vision, and raise sufficient funds to compete after clinching the nomination.

Now, the question then becomes, how does the calendar affect this ability, this overriding objective?

Well, think of some smaller -- some people say, "We've got to identify our nominee early to avoid an extended divisive primary battle, because that will make it easier to unify the party." That is, the sooner we can rally behind our candidate, the better.

There's something to be said for that, obviously. It's also the case that, on the other hand, it isn't obvious that you can use the schedule to achieve that objective. It will have very much to do with whether the party itself is unified or divided, whether Democrats have come together or not come together, and the ability of the candidate, himself or herself, to appeal to different groups within the political party.

So that, as an objective relative to the scheduling, is not obvious, in any case.

Second, the schedule should allow a vetting of candidates over a longer period of time. You've talked about that already. Elaine has talked about it.

It is hard for me to imagine that, if you were designing this from scratch, you wouldn't figure out a way to sequence this over a period of time to take into account new information and to have multiple opportunities to get a reading on these particular candidates.

Another objective the party might have is to engage more and different types of Democratic voters.

Let's face it, this front-loaded system, with the great importance given to Iowa and New Hampshire and the bunching of events at the beginning, simply means a whole lot of Democrats, Democratic voters and types of Democratic voters, are not playing an active and consequential role in the process, and that might be an objective to you, representing the party.

But there are a couple of others. What about attracting more and better candidates by reducing the cash demands on them before the process begins? Is that a consideration that you should have in mind?

And, finally, avoid giving the other party publicity or fundraising advantage. Terry McAuliffe, as was just explained, in the DNC, moved the window up a month in large part because the

Republicans had moved theirs up four years earlier, and there was this period of silence on the Democratic side, while the Republicans were operating. I think that was a more compelling reason for doing it than trying to wrap up the nomination at an early point in time.

Similarly, the funding advantage has to be taken into account because of this long interregnum period between when the nomination is wrapped up and when the convention is held.

Now, some of these objectives are complementary -- the early nominee and the effort to move up to match the Republican schedule, of their window -- but the others clearly conflict with one another. So it seems to me you're going to have to figure out just what is the most important -- what are the most important of these objectives for the party itself, and which are most likely to contribute to the party's ability to nominate the strongest candidate and to move on to the general election.

What I want to suggest to you is that, as you go through this process that you keep two major factors in mind that might not otherwise be front and center. One is the fact that this calendar of primaries and caucuses may have its greatest impact not during the period of the primaries and caucuses, but in the period of the invisible primary, beforehand. That is, it has deeply shaped the way in which candidates -- the timing of candidates' announcements, the way they organize their campaign, the money they have to raise, how the media covers the event. There is a whole lot important going on in the year before, and much of that was in reaction to the calendar as it developed. So that's an important point to keep in mind.

The second thing is the presidential public financing system. Elaine (Kamarck) said she couldn't imagine any candidate -- serious candidate opting into the system.

Don (Fowler) said he thinks money won't be as forthcoming in subsequent years. I'm a little more optimistic than Don on the fundraising front. I think we've really changed fundraising in a fairly significant way, but I do know the presidential public financing system is completely broken, and unless it is changed -- and there's strong reasons to change and improve it -- dramatically increasing spending limits, getting rid of state spending limits, increasing the amount of funds available -- then no serious candidates will opt in -- and you've got to think through the consequences of that for the party and

in the limitations it puts on the kind of people that will actually run.

Anyways, that's the party perspective.

Now, what about the presidential candidates?

Well, no one could say it better than Elaine did in her presentation: candidates want to win the nomination, and the rules in sequencing and timing are a means to that end. On the one hand, they want to capture or deny others a regional group or issue focus advantage that might flow from the particular timing and sequence of events. They also, in a more general sense, want a fair chance to raise the needed funds and to compete for public support.

Now, their calculations will differ, depending upon whether they're frontrunners to begin with, well known, having come out ahead in the year of the invisible primary, or more brush-fire kind of candidates, someone that might break through at the last minute and hope to ride that momentum that's developed.

All I could say here is, many candidates have tried to figure out how to help themselves by shaping and influencing the sequence and timing of events, but few have succeeded. It is really an inexact science.

And to the extent you, as members of this Commission, can remind candidates of that history, you can put more emphasis on the first set of objectives, which are those dealing with the objectives of the party, more generally.

Now, a final item on voter -- the goals of voters. Remember the mandate of the McGovern/Fraser Commission, to give all Democratic voters a full, meaningful, and timely opportunity to participate in the selection of delegates and, thereby, in the decisions of the convention itself. That was the objective. That was the mandate given to the Commission. And what does that require?

Well, it requires that voters have a choice of candidates in a meaningful contest, that there's sufficient information available to them to make an informed choice, and that their choices actually have an opportunity to shape the selection of the nominee.

Now, to what extent is this objective of voters shaped by the calendar? Well, almost certainly it's shaped a great deal by it, and that is one of the greatest sources of unhappiness with the present front-loaded system. I think we just have to acknowledge it.

But it's worth also noting three other points. One, it's not only the timing and sequence of events

that leads to an early resolution of the contest, leaving many voters out; it's the nature of the media and the search for the frontrunner and the winner. It is the whole nature of momentum and how it works and how difficult it is to counter. It is the availability of money at key points as candidates' resources dry up when they lose an early event. You could have a better-sequenced schedule and still not achieve your objective because of these other factors intruding.

Second and third points on the voters. How should we think about voter participation in the primaries? Is it a means or an end? That is to say, is it something we should optimize as an end in itself, or do we want to consider it in terms of a means to achieve the party's broad objective to nominate the strongest candidate best-positioned to win the general election? Remember, one can have indirect expressions of public sentiment. Our old mix system, pre- McGovern/Fraser, tried to do that with a, if you will, "strategic use" of individual primaries to get some sense of public sentiment. The super-delegates are there, virtually 20 percent of the automatic uncommitted delegates. Now, yeah, they follow the results of the primaries and caucuses, but they're also there taking a reading and looking at other information, and, in effect, representing public sentiment.

Finally, back to the invisible primary. It turns out some political scientists have made pretty powerful arguments that the most influential time period in presidential nominations occurs well before Iowa, and that party activists and officials play an absolutely critical role in this process. This is a time when the candidates are out there making appeals to party constituencies and to activists representing African Americans and Latinos and labor unions and feminists and national-security hardliners and a whole host of considerations. Polls are taken, fundraising -- there are many ways -- indirect ways of gauging strength and sentiment. And I think, and many of my academic colleagues believe, much of that is occurring in that early period. And, therefore, one of the things you ought to think about is, one, be aware of that, and ask the question as you deliberate on the calendar and the timing. It's not just how will it play out in the formal process, but how will what we do influence what occurs in the year before? Because that's when so many important activities and events are underway.

My bottom line -- I end here, I hope within my time limit -- is that there's much to critique in the present calendar. It's not what we would design; but in considering changing it, you've got to think

hard about whether you can identify a set – and alternative that will reliably lead to the ultimate outcome that you want. You have to take into account what other forces are operating, apart from a calendar, to shape what's going on. You want to imagine and think through, intellectually, how the candidates and the players will react to each of these changes, because the ultimate party objective -- that is, nominating a strong candidate -- is going to be shaped mostly by factors other than the nominating calendar.

A final point just to underscore what I said before. I think this question of the public financing, the financing of the nominations, is immensely important and has enormous implications for the party and its candidates, and I hope your Commission gives it some attention.

Thank you.

CO-CHAIR HERMAN: Thank you very much, Dr. Mann.

CO-CHAIR HERMAN: We're actually going to take that question up in the next presentation.

Presentation by Dr. Ronald Walters

DR. WALTERS: Thank you, Chairman Price and Chairwoman Alexis Herman, for inviting me here today. Chairman Price, I respect you very much, but when Alexis calls, there are a lot of us that have to show up, and I am one of them. So I'm glad to be here.

It's also good to be with so many of my friends. For some reason, most of them are sitting over here on the left, I think appropriately, but it is good to be here with them today.

I've had a long six months. I arrive here, having just finished a book this weekend on the Voting Rights Act, which will be published in June of this year. And so, I'm very much under the psychological spell of last weekend, when there was the commemoration of the Voting Rights Act and the march at Selma, and an understanding of the fact that we are still, in many ways, working out, I think, the kinks to full political participation that was started back in 1964 and 1965.

And I think we should understand that and remember, for many of us, that a lot of these commissions were really set in motion in 1964 by the tremendous rendition of someone called Fannie Lou Hamer and the demand made on the party at that time to open itself up to full participation.

We've been struggling to do that ever since, and I've just been a bit player in that role.

I came into party affairs in 1974 as an advisor to a group of the first generation of black elected officials who were trying to seek a dignified place in the party charter. I was surprised that the Democratic Party didn't have a charter. And there was a lot of politics around how to write the rules of this charter. So I was pleased to be part of that. I encountered a lot of people around this table and in this room. And I've also -- my colleagues here, Elaine and Tom, I got to know them and their activism, and respect it, as well.

I have been, I think, invited here to say something fairly obvious and really to pick up on what Harold (Ickes) said about Iowa and New Hampshire. But, in the process, I want to say a couple of things that may not be so obvious.

One is that the question put to me had to do something with insurgent candidacies and how insurgent candidacies mobilized themselves with respect to the role of Iowa and New Hampshire in past races. Let me begin by saying that I couldn't get past that question, primarily because the whole dynamic, political dynamic, of who is or is not an insurgent candidate seems to me has something to do with the role of the party. In some ways, I think the party has let the press define who is viable and who is not viable. And I think, just at the outset, this whole question of insurgent candidates really needs to be looked at, because there are people who go into the election season as candidates with the assumption that they are the main candidates, and there is some rallying around them, there is some consensus about, sort of, who they are.

And then when someone else shows up, it's almost like you're injecting a foreign body. There is a presumption that they really are not viable, they really shouldn't be here for some reason or another. I think the that party ought to -- again, in the spirit of Fannie Lou Hamer and that period when we saw openness, I think the party has a role to play with respect to reducing this feeling that there are insurgent candidates who simply, one way or another, don't belong.

And you'll pardon me, because, as someone who had to do a lot of writing to the media and explaining about why Reverend Jackson was in the race in the first place, I got a little bit sensitive to having to explain, time after time after time, what he was doing there.

When concepts like, "Well, a spoiler" were out there, "No, you really can't win," and so forth, I think, again the party really has a responsibility to

open itself up and to challenge these media conceptions of who is and who is not viable to run for President.

Who knows who is a spoiler? Who knows if the American people really don't want some of these candidates, rather than simply the traditional ones?

I think what we have seen, especially on the Republican side in the last two decades, an amazing destruction of this whole concept of the fact that you need to be, or have been, in a parliamentary body to be viable to run for office at any level of government.

That has been literally destroyed. And I've watched the destruction of it. And, again, I harken back to the media criticisms that, well, some of our candidates don't have past legislative experience. So, again, I would simply caution us to deal with that issue of insurgency in a far more humane and, in some ways, democratic way.

I think it is right to point attention, as Tom did, to the conflicting objectives, therefore, of a party and the candidates, as Elaine also did. I think -- again, let me say something a little different here -- the question of -- in the literature, between, on the one hand, office-seekers who are legitimate, and, on the other, agenda-setters. I want to point to this, because elections are used for different things. I'm not going to surprise anyone here by that point.

Elections are used for different things. And, of course, the party does have a role in coming out with a nominee, obviously, and somebody who is viable to run in the general election. But the broad expanse of the party and the various constituencies, they have different motivations for fielding candidates, and I would think that some of those agenda-setting motivations of some of the candidates really ought to be recognized. It is not a threat, I think, to the party to be charitable about that.

I think, in some ways, one ought to realize -- is that by participating at a certain level -- high level participation of constituency groups in the party primary season, one helps to strengthen the mobilizational capacity of those various groups. This is not simply follower-ship; this is the mobilization of those groups in order to participate in party affairs, which I think is important.

So I lay that down on the table as something that I think probably hasn't been thought about, or thought out, before. But, again, I think it is something about which I think the party ought to be somewhat charitable.

I will make the obvious point, that in 1984 it is true that when one looked at the arrangement of the primaries, the 46 percent of the delegates who were to be chosen in nine primaries, and 20 in binding caucuses, between the end of March -- end of February and the end of March, that rough, sort of, one-month period.

Half of the delegates -- that is an amazing -- an amazing operation in front-loading. What this did, not only for Reverend Jackson, but for others who were running in 1984, was to force a lot of the campaign activity into 1983. And, again, one wonders, just looking at this past election cycle, how early are people going to begin to run? A lot of it has to do with what Tom said about money. You have to begin then to raise money now in a four-year cycle. You can't wait, as some candidates used to be able to do, the year before; or, some candidates, that year. But it does -- by front-loading, it does push you further back, further back, further back, and it does disadvantage candidates who don't have as many resources to do that. It makes it necessary for them to begin to run much, much earlier.

It is true that Reverend Jackson, of course, was determined to run in New Hampshire and Iowa, and he understood that, in Iowa, the black population was 2.1 percent, and it was .7 percent in New Hampshire. But he wanted to prove that he could pick up votes that were not black votes. He wanted to pick up white votes. But, in doing so, he was under tremendous, tremendous disadvantage for having, in those first two primaries, to prove that he could do that.

And so, I wondered -- in 1984, I wondered, "What in the hell are we doing here?" You know? But I think we understood what we were trying to do, but it was extremely, extremely difficult, especially in New Hampshire, let me just say that. Because the Manchester Union Leader wrote one piece on Jackson.

They called him a "tool of the communists." And so, that having to campaign right off the bat in a place like that puts you sometimes at a very serious disadvantage. Minority candidates would appear, then, to begin with a deficit with respect to being eligible for campaign in places like that.

But let me say one other thing. It also means that they have a deficit with respect to campaign financing, because, at that time, you had to win at least 10 percent in two successive campaigns in order to remain viable for campaign financing, which means that if you stack the deck right off the bat, again, you put these candidates

behind with respect to their ability to participate in something that I think everybody else does, and that is campaign financing.

So I think that that's something really to be looked at.

In 1988, I think we had pretty much the same story, except that Jackson was able to do much better in both of these places. No less than William Safire said that Jackson was the big winner in New Hampshire because he came out of there with a 9 percent in a state that was only 3 percent black. And one wouldn't expect Bill Safire to say that, but he did, and it gave, I think, a boost to the candidacy in 1988.

Let me just fast-forward, as I try to wind this down, to a previous election cycle and say that Reverend Sharpton, Ambassador Carol Moseley Braun did the same thing, primarily because there was a very interesting sort of Black and Brown Forum in New Hampshire. But when you look beyond the forum, they would, sort of, enable the field the kind of political operations that would attract many voters, even though they were there campaigning.

I think that if -- with respect to Reverend Sharpton, if the District of Columbia had not, sort of, forced this beauty contest on the party, he would not have had an opportunity to actually get in the race at an early time and make a statement that he was a viable candidate. In other words, break this, sort of, lock that the media had on determining the question of political viability.

That helped -- I think it helped Howard Dean, and I think that it played a very interesting role, because, certainly in the case of Al Sharpton, when he was up in New Hampshire, it was clear to me that he wasn't speaking to New Hampshire; he was speaking to people in South Carolina. And so, that, again, for candidates like that, what it does is to put upon them a responsibility for deflecting their message. They're not speaking to the people who are in front of them, because they don't have any stake there; they're speaking to other people in other states. And I think that is, sort of, symptomatic of the kind of disadvantage that I'm talking about.

So, again, I think the party has a legitimate, but a relatively narrow, objective. I think what you heard Tom saying is that I think the party ought to think about the narrowness of that objective, and broaden it from a simple game of attrition of candidates in the race to a more deepened and enriched democratic process. I think there are those who, when you look back through the record,

as I did, think that John Kerry might have benefited from having a little longer process, where you could do retail politics in more places. I do believe that even in a state like Michigan, you can do retail politics because one of the disadvantages, of course, is that not enough people were familiar with him. And he tried to change his campaign in ways that would make him more familiar to people. Many times, I think maybe too much. But I think some of that was forced upon him by the vagaries of the campaign system, itself.

I found -- just one thought that I would like to also throw out, and that is, one scholar, Byron Shafer, talked about the fact that intermediary groups, such as racial and ethnic associations, neighborhood groups, and other large groups, no longer played a fundamental role in the presidential selection process of the party. Now, it's -- however one thinks about that, it's possible to agree, I think, or disagree with that, but it is true that if one moves -- first of all, positions retail politics outside of these communities, I think he's right. And, number two, the creation of regional primaries where it's difficult to campaign means that he's right. So I think, on both scores, it is true that, with the current system, I think one doesn't really get into some of these communities until after the primaries are over.

I think that when one looks at the problem that I'm talking about, there's even, I think -- I run into, the literature, a legal case that could be made with respect to the Voting Rights Act, and that is section 2. If section 2 suggests that one shouldn't dilute the vote of minorities, and if it is the case that having these -- this system of Iowa and New Hampshire the way they are and the way they have been -- dilutes the vote -- then I think, at some point, maybe in 2007, when people are thinking about renewing the Voting Rights Act, people will begin to think about the way in which this impacts on political party structures, as well as having the effect of diluting the black vote.

Now, finally, I would think that the party has a role in broadening its conception of the primary because of what happened in 2000 and 2004. Again, this very narrow objective, I think, has to be re-conceived of as a tool of political education and political participation, because the Democratic Party is losing these elections, because it is not educating its people, politically, to participate, and because it's not paying enough attention to the mechanics of political participation. This is being retailed out to other people, but this ought to be one of the largest, if not the largest, responsibility of the party. And so, we really can't talk, I think, about what happened in

Florida and what happened in places like Ohio and so forth, without saying, Wait a minute, can the party afford to continue to go down this road, having this really very narrow objective with respect to the campaign season, and not use this period as a way of doing political education of all kinds in order to prepare the people who say they're Democrats to participate in the fall?

Thank you very much.

CO-CHAIR HERMAN: Thank you, Dr. Walters. We allotted more time for presentation for this panel, so, therefore, we're going to limit questions to only three. And I'm going to recognize Jerry Crawford, Jim Pederson, and Congresswoman Hilda Solis.

MR. CRAWFORD: Thank you, Madam Chair. A quick observation and then a question. Mr. Walters, I want you to know that the Brown and Black Forum, which you referenced, occurs in Iowa, not in New Hampshire. I think Governor Shaheen would join me in that. Representative -- State Representative Wayne Ford and Mary Campos have done terrific work with that forum. It was a pivotal event in the Iowa caucuses this year, as it has been in prior caucus campaigns. So, on their behalf, I simply wanted to clarify that observation.

And then my question for Tom. You know, I think there's one thing, sitting here next to my neighbors from Michigan, that we could get a unanimous vote on today or at the end of our deliberation, and that is that if, as a group, we could come up with a calendar that assured that we would elect Democratic presidents in the future, I think we would all quickly and eagerly set aside any interests we come to this group with. And I think you did a good job of outlining that as the party's goal, to find -- I think in your words, to nominate a strong candidate who can compete effectively, appealing both to the base and to swing voters. But, as I reflect backward in time, I have a hard time going back all the way from 2004 to, say, 1976. I have trouble seeing a cycle where we didn't, in fact, choose, if not our strongest candidate -- and we might all quibble and have some nuanced distinctions about that -- certainly one of the very strongest candidates we had available during that period of time. So hasn't the process worked pretty well, in terms of pursuit of the goal you articulated?

DR. MANN: I think that is -- your observation is consistent with my argument that many factors beyond the sequencing and timing of

primaries and caucuses are critical in producing the party's nominee. And, therefore, in thinking about the calendar, you have to realize you're dealing -- at the margin -- you're dealing with one among many factors. And, in fact, I went through the historical counterfactual and tried to imagine whether a different sequence would have produced different candidates -- quite apart from stronger or weaker, but just different -- and it's hard to come up with that in the more contemporary period. You could do it going back to 1972 and 1976, I think, rather effectively. But it took awhile for the party and the candidates to adapt to the new rules. And once they did, they figured out a way to work within the present system.

All I'm suggesting is that I think it is worth keeping in mind the primary objective when you go about your deliberations, that it's -- you know, Ron made a perfectly valid point, it is not the only one, and there are other considerations about revitalizing the party. But, in my view, that is part of what a successful candidate selection process does.

CO-CHAIR HERMAN: Thank you very much. We'll move quickly now to Jim, and then the last question from Congresswoman Solis.

MR. PEDERSON: Dr. Mann, I was interested in your comment, or your suggestion, that perhaps we ought to take a look at ancillary benefits other than the calendar in the primary process. And my specific point is party-building. I know that Arizona had the earliest primary in 2004 that we ever had. It resulted in a tremendous increase in registration, new people into the party, as well as fundraising. I know that in New Hampshire and Iowa there have been tremendous assets that have gone to their state parties because of their early primary.

Now, as Mr. (Michael) Stratton mentioned, there are four states in the Southwest that are on the cusp of going from red to blue, which could have a tremendous impact on the 2008 elections. And I guess my question is, Should we be taking a look at this a bit more globally than just the calendar, to include goals that may have a dramatic effect on the '08 elections?

DR. MANN: Absolutely. I mean, it's incontrovertible that that makes very good sense. The fact that New Mexico and Arizona came so early in the process this time created -- gave you additional resources to strengthen the party and mobilize supporters. And that was a good thing.

But, beyond the timing issue, there are other factors that can help you in that task.

CO-CHAIR HERMAN: Thank you. Congresswoman Solis?

REPRESENTATIVE SOLIS: Thank you. Mine is somewhat of a comment. I want to thank Mr. Ronald Walters for his comments about the need to include what you deem as insurgent candidates. I would tend to say that those candidates brought up issues that perhaps other mainstream candidates did not address until later on. And that, I see as something that hurt some of the populations that we represent exclusively, the minority communities and more activist groups that feel that somehow they're not being attended to. My other question or concern is that, in fact, we spent a lot of time in Iowa and New Hampshire, even bringing in folks from as far away as California to do outreach with African American and Latino. They tried very hard, and they spent a lot of money doing that, when that money and time could be spent helping to garnish other areas that have been neglected or should be more of a focus. And I guess my question is;

What is it that our party -- what should our party goals be here? Are we intending on trying to build foundation that is inclusive of "all our party"?

Or is it just about looking at the lead horse and trying to figure out where that person is going to do better?

DR. WALTERS: Well, I think that Tom and I are singing the same tune with respect to this last question. And yours, I would say the same thing, that there are more than -- I tried to call it a "narrow goal of the party" -- I think there's more at stake here than the narrow goal of the attrition of people and arranging the primary season so that you affect an attrition of people and you come out with this one great candidate. Because you can do that effectively -- and have the party still not be prepared to participate in the fall.

I think what we're saying here, and what you're saying, is, there needs to be -- and I think the term that was used is "party-building" -- there needs to be some -- I talked about, certainly, the new technologies, the electronic technologies -- I've traveled all over -- this last electronic season -- and I say "electronic" season, because part of it I did on the Internet, but part of it I did on the plane -- as the chairman of a 527, as a board member of nonpartisan get-out-the-vote organization. And I

can tell you, I spoke to a lot of places where people were simply dumbfounded by the new rules and by the new procedures.

And my question is, whose responsibility is it to educate them so that they're ready to vote, ready to participate? I think that it's yours. Certainly, other organizations can play a role, but unless you do this, my assumption is you're going to continue to lose. There are some pretty smart people over on the other side, and they did this. They did this. And they did it effectively. And I don't think that the party can continue with these sort of narrow objectives without being more expansive and more inclusive.

CO-CHAIR HERMAN: Thank you very much, Dr. Walters and Dr. Mann. Let's give them another round of applause. Thank you.